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Federal Regulation of Air Transportation and the
Environmental Impact Problem
The only thing that can drown out a jet aircraft on take-off, Secretary
of Transportation Alan S. Boyd has said, is "the roar of protest from
outraged citizens who live in airport neighborhoods."' Both the air-
craft and the people are getting louder, and there is little immediate
prospect of a technological breakthrough that will quiet them. Present
estimates are that a quieter jet aircraft engine will not be feasible
before the 1970's. 2 By that time, the supersonic transport threatens to
make the sonic boom an ordinary occurrence, and craft capable of
operating from rooftop airports may well introduce air transportation,
and a new noise source, into downtown areas.3 There is widespread
recognition that something must be done to identify and deal with the
unwanted byproducts of aviation.4
1 Samuelson, The SST and the Government: Critics Shout Into a Vacuum, 157 ScmNcE
1146, 1149 (1967). One indication of the magnitude of the protest is that more than 175
suits are pending against 34 airport authorities, with damage claims adding to millions
of dollars. 1 CCH CLEAN Ant NEws No. 39, at 8 (Oct. 17, 1967). Private actions for damages
from intrusive overflights are the subject of numerous law review articles, including:
Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MIcH. L. Rv.
1313 (1958); Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19
U. MrAmi L. REv. 1 (1964); Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1373 (1965);
Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. AIR L. & CoMr. 387 (1966); Note, Air-
plane Noise, Property Rights, and the Constitution, 65 COLUm. L. Rav. 1428 (1965); Note,
Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HAav. L. Ray. 1581 (1961); Note,
jet Noise in Airport Areas: A National Solution Required, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 1087 (1967).
2 For a description of current federal research and development programs aimed at the
noise problem, see 113 CONG. Rac. H12607 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1967); Hearings on H.R.
4450, H.R. 6470 Before the Subcomm. on Advanced Research &r Technology, House Comm.
on Science & Astronautics, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 364-78, 391-406 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings]; Hornig, Report to the President, 3
WrEKLY COMPIL. Prs. Docs. 527-28 (1967).
3 On the SST, see Hearings on H.R. 11456 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 385-444 (1967) (FAA presentation) [hereinafter
cited as Senate 1968 DOT Appropriations Hearings]; id. at 557-89 (testimony of Senator
William Proxmire and Bo Lundberg); Hearings on Dep't of Transp. Appropriations for
1968 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
278-350 (1967) (FAA presentation) [hereinafter cited as House 1968 DOT Appropriations
Hearings]. On VTOL aircraft, see notes 44-50 and accompanying text infra. See also House
1968 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 40-42, 351-56, on federal V/
STOL research. The FAA is also actively engaged in V/STOL research. See House 1968
DOT Appropriations Hearings, supra at 222-23.
4 See Aircraft Noise and Land Use Near Airports, 3 WraLY Co ip r. Pmns. Docs. 527
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Aviation is extensively regulated by the federal government. The
Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with "economic" regulation of air
transportation,5 the Federal Aviation Administration in the Depart-
ment of Transportation with "safety" regulation of aviation.6 Noise
and other environmental consequences7 of aircraft operation do not
fall squarely within either category. They are not regulated directly,
and little has been done indirectly to require their abatement.
The Civil Aeronautics Board determines whether to authorize the
institution of air carrier service between designated points." It has not
considered environmental impact pertinent to these determinations.
In a new route proceeding, the Board has held:
[A]ny issues of environmental impact... at best can involve
only questions of the general effect of operations by par-
ticular types of aircraft at various altitudes adjacent to or
over congested areas ....
The "factors which most directly relate" to environmental impact are
the location of airports or landing areas and flight patterns, according
to the Board. Neither, it indicated, is at issue in its proceedings, 9
(1967) (Memorandum from the President to Heads of Departments and Agencies); Fed-
eral Aircraft Noise Program Management Committee, Status of the Federal Aircraft Noise
Abatement Programj Feb, 1, 1967, reprinted in House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings,
supra note 2, pt. 4, at 365 and 473; H.R. Doc. No. 399, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966)
(President's message on transportation), See generally SPECIAL SUBCOMLI. ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES, HOUSE COMM, ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
AIRCRAF NoIsE PROBLEms, H.R. RE. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); U.S. OFFICE OF
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, JET AIRCRAFT NoISE PANEL, ALLEVIATION OF JET AIRCRAFT NOIsE
NEAR AIRPORTS (1966).
5 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1542 (1964), especially tit. IV, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1371-87.
6 See id., especially tit. 1II, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1341-55, and tit. VI, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-30.
7 On air pollution from aircraft, see U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SEav., Drv. OF AIR PoLLU-
TION, A SURVEY OF Am POLLUTION IN COMMUNITIEs AROUND THE JOHN F, KENNEDY INT'L
AIRPORT (1966).
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964). Not all intrusive aircraft
are operated by domestic air carriers subject to this regulation. Some air transportation
is exempted by the Board under id, § 416(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b); foreign air tansporta-
tion presents additional problems of which the President is final arbiter. See id. §§ 402,
801, 49 U.SC. §§ 1372, 1461. General aviation is subject to FAA, but not CAB, regulation.
Military aircraft, controlled to some extent by FAA regulation, are not considered in this
comment.
9 Washington/Baltimore Helicopter Serv. Investigation, CAB Order No. E-25704 (Sept.
19, 1967). The issue Was before the Board on petitions for review of denial of intervention
in a helicopter certification proceeding filed by citizens' groups. The petitioners alleged
that they had a substantial interest in the proceeding, a requirement for intervention
under the Board's Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1967), based on the environ-
mental impact on them of the proposed service.
The Board held, 3-2, that formal intervention was properly denied these petitioners.
The majority found that the petitioners failed to allege "any unique injury which will
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The Department of Transportation does not agree. It has argued to
the Board that consideration of environmental impact-and specifi-
cally noise and air pollution-is a relevant and important factor to
be weighed in determining whether to authorize air service.10 But the
Department construes its own authority to consider noise output
narrowly. The Federal Aviation Administration considers noise in
formulating flight procedures, but not in licensing equipment or as-
signing airways to carriers." It has requested legislative authorization
to establish noise standards and criteria and apply them to equipment
certification. 12 Noise abatement flight procedures, it contends, are a
"poor substitute" for certification authority because they do not in-
dude "many of the incentives for quiet operation which can be built
into certification rules."' 3
The power of localities to adopt noise abatement ordinances aimed
not be shared equally by all similarly situated property owners" and made "no showing
that the environmental impact of helicopter operations may be expected to differ from
that inflicted by other aircraft which may pass at low altitudes over residential areas" or
that a helicopter proceeding "is essentially different in this respect from any other new
route case."
Primarily, however, the Board relied on its holding that airport location and flight
paths are not at issue to find that any potential injury to the petitioners is "both remote
and speculative." Participation by the Department of Transportation, and by the petition-
ers on an informal basis, the Board held, "may be expected to amply articulate the
broad public interest in environmental impact." The Board buttressed its conclusion with
the argument that there are "undoubtedly thousands" of residents and property owners
whose interests will be remotely affected by additional service at metropolitan airports.
These persons will have different interests; if each were allowed to intervene formally
"proceedings which are already burdened by numerous parties would become nearly
uncontrollable."
In petitioners' appeal from the Board's order, the Department of Justice takes the
position that intervention was improperly denied. Brief for Respondent at 35, Palisades
Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. CAB, No. 21422 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 13, 1967).
10 Answer of the Dep't of Transportation to Petitions for Review of Staff Action Filed
by the Committee Against National, Concerned Citizens, the Palisades Citizens Asso-
ciation, Washington-Baltimore Helicopter Service Investigation, CAB Docket No. 17665,
at 2 (Aug. 10, 1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REc. H12619 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1967) [here-
inafter cited as DOT Helicopter Answer].
11 Under Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 307, 603, 604, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1423, 1424.
See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
12 S. 3591, H.R. 16171, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 707, H.R. 3400, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1967). As introduced, the legislation would cover all title VI certifications, including
air carrier operating-as well as aircraft, equipment, and airworthiness-certificates.
Hearings were held before the Transportation and Aeronautics Subcommittee of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in October 1966 and in November
1967. On the latter hearings, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1967, at 1, col. 7; id., Nov. 16, 1967,
at 1, col. 7; id., Nov. 17, 1967, at 40, col. 3.
13 113 CONG. REc. A4216 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1967) (letter from Secretary of Transporta-
tion Alan S. Boyd to Representative Herbert Tenzer). See also House 1968 NASA Autho-
rization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 374-75, 387-89, 436, 444, 445-46.
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at or including aircraft operations is extremely limited. Because fed-
eral regulation of air transportation is so extensive, local regulation
at variance with it may be unconstitutional. "Local initiative in noise
control of aviation," one district court recently held, "cannot coexist
with a comprehensive system of federal regulation" of air transporta-
tion,14 despite the failure of that system to deal with noise effectively.
This comment is concerned with the extent of the authority of the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Administration to
consider noise in their respective certification proceedings. The argu-
ment is advanced that, even under present legislation, the Board must
and the Administrator may15 consider the environmental impact of
air transportation. Amendment of the Federal Aviation Act to clarify
this authority may be desirable. Unless such legislation is carefully
drafted, however, the results may be discouraging to opponents of air-
craft noise.
I
Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act provides that no air carrier
shall engage in air transportation unless authorized to do so by the
Civil Aeronautics Board.' 6 Authorization is dependent upon a finding
that the transportation is "required by the public convenience and
necessity."'17
"Public convenience and necessity" is not wholly undefined in the
Act. Section 102 requires the Board to consider several enumerated
criteria "among other things" in accordance with the public con-
14 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 235 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
15 The distinction between compulsion and discretion is primarily a matter of who
has standing to raise the issue before the Board, on the one hand, and the Administrator
of the FAA, on the other. Whether persons may intervene solely on the environmental
impact issue-a contention the Board answered negatively (see note 9 supra)-is pres-
ently sub judice. No matter how that appeal may be decided, there are parties in a CAB
proceeding, with a substantial interest on grounds independent of environmental impact,
who might raise the issue before the Board and on appeal to the courts. For example,
municipalities to which service is proposed may intervene under Board Rule of Practice
15(b), 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1967). While none has raised the environmental impact issue,
and few may be expected to, as intervenors they have standing to do so. See Juarez Gas
Co., S.A. v. FP, 375 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Office of Communications of Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 884 U.S. 941 (1966). This is not necessarily true
in FAA rule-making and certification proceedings. Standing to intervene and to appeal
FAA orders is much more limited, at least on the face of the statutory and administra-
tive provisions.
16 Section 401(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1964).
17 Section 401(d)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1) (1964). Authorization also requires a finding
that the carrier is "fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation." Id.
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venience and necessity. 18 Two of these criteria-the encouragement
and development of an air transportation system "properly adapted to
the present and future needs" of commerce, the postal service, and
defense and regulation in such manner as to "recognize and preserve
the inherent advantages" of air transportation-appear to suggest that
regulation should aim at maximizing the benefits and minimizing the
detriments of air service. A "properly adapted" system implies a broad
view of national transportation needs; recognition of "inherent ad-
vantages" presupposes comparison with other transport modes and
realization that aviation's advantages are not unlimited. Moreover,
because the enumerated factors are not exclusive, it has been argued
that environmental impact is among the "other things" the Board is
directed to consider.19
Congress intended that the Board consider factors beyond its regu-
latory control in public convenience and necessity determinations.
The Federal Aviation Act transferred the Board's authority over air
safety to the FAA;20 nevertheless, section 102(e) requires the Board to
consider the promotion of air safety in accord with the public con-
venience and necessity.21 Similarly, even if it is concluded that the
Board is without authority to regulate environmental impact, it does
not follow that it may neglect this factor.22
18 Section 102, as codified, reads as follows:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter, the
Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation system prop-
erly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and
foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the
relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers
at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or ad-
vantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense;(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(1) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.
49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
19 DOT Helicopter Answer, supra note 10, at 2.
20 Other than investigation of accidents under title VII, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1443 (1964)
and appeals from FAA determinations under title VI, § 609, 49 U.S.C. § 1429 (1964),
functions transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board in 1966. Department of
Transportation Act § 6(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(d) (Supp. 1966).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1958).
22 It is here contended that the Board has some indirect regulatory control over
environmental impact. See notes 65-82 and accompanying text infra.
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In the Department of Transportation Act, Congress declared that
the national transportation policy includes maximum conservation of
historic sites, recreation areas, and natural beauty.23 Congress has
stressed the importance of compatible land use around airports24 and
indicated its concern with the airport noise problem. 25 While few
provisions of this recent legislation directly apply to the Board,26
national policy is relevant to the scope of public convenience and
necessity.
"Public convenience and necessity" has a long history of judicial
and administrative interpretation. Most of the case law is unrelated to
the composition of the "public" to which the term of art applies. Most
often, the public is affected only as consumers of the regulated service;
only infrequently have courts or regulatory agencies been asked to
construe the phrase as involving a weighing of benefits to the consum-
ing public against costs to other members of the public. In the ordi-
nary proceeding, opposition, if any, is not to the service as such but
to the adverse effect of its authorization on competitors. Convenience
and necessity of the service to the users is presumed. The determina-
tion is limited to consideration of its economic impact on the regulated
industry.27 In this setting, alternative means of providing the service,
or need for the service at all, are not usually explored.
The assumption that regulatory agencies may disregard benefits and
detriments external to the regulated industry has come under increas-
ing scrutiny by the courts. They have recognized that the public
interest or public convenience and necessity cannot be so easily
23 Department of Transportation Act §§ 2(a), (b)(2), 4(f), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651(a), (b)(2),
1653(f) (Supp. 1966). See S. REP. No. 1659, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966).
24 Federal Airport Act §§ 9(d)(3), 11(4), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1108(d)(3), 1110(4) (1964). See
14 C.F.R. §§ 151.26(a), (b), 151.39(a)(4), (5) (1967).
25 Department of Transportation Act § 4(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (Supp. 1966) (authoriz-
ing DOT research and development in noise abatement, "with particular attention to air-
craft noise"); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 1113, 12 U.S.C. § 170ld-3
note (Supp. 1966), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-19, § 22(h), 81 Stat. 27 (1967) (authoriz-
ing HUD study of feasible methods of reducing economic loss and hardship suffered
by homeowners as a result of depreciation following the construction of airports near
their homes, including methods of noise insulation). The latter study has been published.
U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., FEDERAL HOUSING ADMIN., INSULATING HOmS
rRoM AmcRA.r NoIsE (1967).
26 Section 106 of the Historic Sites Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (Supp. 1966),
does apply directly to the Board. It requires that a federal department or independent
agency, before issuing any license, take into account the effect of the proposed under-
taking on any historic site and afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation an
opportunity to comment. Cf. the use made of the Anadromous Fish Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 757a-757f (Supp. 1966), in Udal v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 438-40 (1967), discussed at notes
28-32 and accompanying text infra.
27 Cf. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1238-47 (1966).
[Vol. 35:317
Regulation of Environmental Impact
delimited. Two cases, involving licensing of hydroelectric projects
under the Federal Power Act, dominate this area of law.
Udall v. FPC28 involved the licensing of the Pacific Northwest Power
Company to construct a hydroelectric power project at High Mountain
Sheep on the Snake River. The Supreme Court ordered the case
remanded to the FPC because the Commission had failed to explore
the alternative of federal development of the site.29 In discussing the
scope of the issues and the Commission's duty on remand, the Court
considered section 10(a) of the Act, which provides that, as a condition
to licensing:
[T]he project adopted.., shall be such as in the judgment
of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive
plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for
the improvement and utilization of water-power develop-
ment, and for other beneficial public uses, including recrea-
tional purposes .... 30
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the test of
whether a license should be issued is not simply whether the project
will be beneficial to the licensee and whether the region will be able
to use the additional power. The test is whether the project will be in
the public interest. This determination requires an exploration of all
factors relevant to the public interest, including-in addition to future
power demand and supply-alternative sources of power, the public
interest in preserving wild rivers and wilderness areas, the preserva-
tion of anadromous fish, and the protection of wildlife.3 ' The Court
refused to assume that the Federal Power Act "commands the im-
mediate construction of as many projects as possible."3 2
The Udall case followed a decision by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals setting aside an FPC license authorizing Consolidated Edi-
28 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
29 Section 7(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 800(b) (1964), provides: "When-
ever, in the judgment of the commission, the development of any water resources for
public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself, the commission shall
not approve any application for any project affecting such development ......
a0 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964). The licensing standard, § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1964),
is "necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for
the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in" any
navigable streams or bodies of water, with the proviso that whenever the contemplated
development is "desirable and justified in the public interest for the purpose of
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or
foreign commerce," the Commission shall make a finding to that effect.
31 387 U.S. at 450.
32 Id. at 449.
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son of New York to construct a pumped storage hydroelectric plant at
Storm King Mountain on the Hudson River.3 The court there found
that the record "fails markedly to make out a case for the Storm King
project on, among other matters, costs, public convenience and neces-
sity, and absence of reasonable alternatives."34 It held that the Com-
mission has a "specific planning responsibility" under section 10(a)
and that the "totality of a project's immediate and long-range effects,
and not merely the engineering and navigation aspects, are to be con-
sidered in a licensing proceeding."35 The court ordered the Commis-
sion to include as "a basic concern" in the proceedings on remand the
preservation of natural beauty and national historic shrines, "keeping
in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of a project is only one of
several factors to be considered." 36
The Commission, said the court, could not assume a passive role;
it "must see to it that the record is complete"; it "has an affirmative
duty to inquire into all relevant facts," including possible alternatives
to the proposed project. The court pointed out:
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed
to be the representative of the public interest. This role does
not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and
strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the
public must receive active and affirmative protection at the
hands of the Commission.3 7
Taken together, Udall and Scenic Hudson lead to two conclusions
relevant here. First, the scope of "public interest" cannot be limited
to the interests of the consuming public and the regulated industry.
Demand and dollar outlays for the proposed service cannot be con-
trolling. Noneconomic factors, whether natural beauty or wildlife
resources, must be included in the balance. Second, the regulatory
agency must fill any gaps in the record before making a decision. It
must seek to interject issues, even those beyond its regulatory jurisdic-
tion, into the proceeding.
Neither of these conclusions is limited to Federal Power Act pro-
ceedings. Courts have required a similarly inclusive construction of
33 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966).
34 354 F.2d at 624-25.
35 Id. at 620. Specifically, the court held that the Commission should have inquired
into the cost of running segments of the transmission line underground in this area of
"unique beauty." Id. at 623.
36 Id. at 624.
37 Id. at 620. On this point see Comment, Of Birds, Bees, and the FPC, 77 YALE L.J.
117 (1967).
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public convenience and necessity under the Natural Gas Act. The
Supreme Court has held that a public convenience and necessity
determination under that Act "requires the [Federal Power] Commis-
sion to evaluate all relevant factors," 38 including conservation of
natural gas and air pollution alleviation through increased use of this
fuel.39 Circuit courts have pointed out that a regulatory agency cannot
limit its view of the public interest to the horizons of the private
parties to the proceeding 0 and that it must consider effects on competi-
tive industries in determining public convenience and necessity,41 as
well as alternatives to an applicant's proposal.42 That it has no au-
thority to command a more desirable alternative does not mean that
it cannot reject the proposal. 43
The Civil Aeronautics Board has not indicated a willingness to
follow the lead of the courts in broadly construing the scope of the
issues in a certification proceeding. A recent Board order instituting
an investigation of the need for, and feasibility of, VTOL, V/STOL,
and STOL service between metropolitan areas in the northeast cor-
ridor 44 is indicative of the Board's conception of its role.
The Board declared that the "major problem and principal matter"
to be considered in the VTOL Investigation is improvement in the
quality of air service in northeast corridor markets, "particularly to
meet the needs of the business traveler." It noted that air transporta-
tion is slowed because of the difficulty of ground transportation and
congestion of existing airports in the corridor. The Board reasoned
38 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959). The licensing
standard in the Natural Gas Act, § 7(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1964), reads "is or will be
required by the present or future public convenience and necessity."
39 FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
40 Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
41 City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); cf. Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 265 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
42 City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
43 Id. at 751 n.28. On the scope of "public interest" under other statutes, see Denver
& R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 492 (1967) (The Court has "read terms such
as 'public interest' broadly, to require consideration of all important consequences.");
Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957); ICC v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942); United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939); New York Cent.
Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1952).
44 Northeast Corridor VTOL Investigation, CAB Order No. E-25779 (Oct. 4, 1967)
(order instituting Docket No. 19078). The "metropolitan areas" to be considered are
Boston, Hartford, Providence, New York/Newark, Philadelphia/Wilmington/Trenton,
Baltimore, and Washington. The Board defines VTOL, the "principal focus of the investi-
gation," as vertical take-off and landing equipment; V/STOL as "a type of aircraft which
has vertical take-off and landing capability, but is also designed to benefit from short
take-off and landing runs"; and STOL as equipment capable of short take-off and land-
ing runs.
1968]
The University of Chicago Law Review
that the speed advantages of air transportation could be maximized by
making a convenient service available to the business traveler from
the center of one city to the center of another, or even (since "it may
be that the business traveler resides in a suburban point") from the
suburbs to his business destination in the center of the other city.
VTOL service could reduce congestion at existing airports, since a
significant portion of flights now operating from these airports in the
corridor are "primarily for the benefit of, and in response to, business
travel." Moving this travel from existing airports would improve
their capability to handle flights to and from points outside the
corridor.45
The Board found statutory authority for its investigation, despite
the lack of operational aircraft and city and suburban landing points
at the present time, in its obligation to "promote and develop air trans-
portation." To permit coordination of urban renewal programs with
the establishment of appropriate landing sites-coordination which
the Board believes "may be an important factor in orderly redevelop-
ment embracing transportation as a key element" 46-the Department
of Housing and Urban Development is made a party to the proceed-
ing.47
Noise went unmentioned in the Board's order, although it is a
major problem with vertical and short take-off and landing aircraft.
The FAA has admitted that the "potential of V/STOL aircraft for
dose-in operation is their selling feature, but the noise they produce
could be their ruin. '48 It has warned that future helicopters and
V/STOL craft will "have to be quieter than aircraft in operation
today," and that landing sites "should be convenient, but somewhat
displaced from the heart of the city" in industrial, rather than business
or residential, areas.49
Transportation alternatives are also germane to northeast corridor
VTOL service, particularly because the federal government is actively
45 Consequently, existing airports are excluded from consideration as possible landing
points for the new service. In addition, the Board will consider amendment of certificates
of carriers presently flying northeast corridor routes to restrict their service to existing
airports.
46 For one conception of how this "key element" might look in a downtown area, see
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1967, at 37, col. 1.
47 In addition to its urban renewal authority, HUD has research and coordination
responsibility in the aircraft noise field. See notes 25 supra and 64 infra.
48 Federal Aviation Admin., Aircraft Dev. Serv., First Annual RID Report to Industry,
V/STOL Air Transportation 2 (mimeo. 1967). reprinted in part in 1 CCH CLEAN Ant
NEws No. 80, at 5 (Aug. 15, 1967).
49 Id. at 5. The FAA suggests locations "over railroad yards and highways and along
highways." Id.
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involved in research and development and demonstration programs
for high-speed ground transportation in the corridor. 50
The order instituting the VTOL investigation indicates the Board's
reluctance to expand the scope of already protracted proceedings un-
der section 401. One can hardly expect an agency which considers the
promotion of air transportation one of its primary duties5l to view
proposals for new service skeptically because air transportation in-
volves detriments as well as benefits. The Civil Aeronautics Board is
not the agency to which overall transportation planning authority
would be given if the regulatory apparatus were rationally organized.
Nor, perhaps, should transportation planning be conducted in ad-
ministrative proceedings that result in obscuring basic public interest
questions about the need for service and possible alternatives in a
mass of evidence about which private applicant is most qualified to
perform the service. But political exigencies have produced such a
system of transportation decision-making. The question is not whether
this is the optimum arrangement, but how the regulatory agency might
take into account all the relevant issues in making its determinations.52
The relative maturity of the air transportation industry under-
scores the desirability of the Board's adopting a different outlook now
from that it assumed when the industry was in economic difficulty and
required active governmental assistance. It is no longer sufficient, if
it ever was, for the Board to consider promotion of air transportation
and the establishment of orderly competition within the industry as its
major functions. The noise problem, as well as airport congestion and
ground transportation delays, compel a broader view.
In the past, aside from diversion from competitive air carriers, the
50 The High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1631-42 (Supp.
1966), authorizes these activities to determine the contribution high speed ground trans-
portation could make to more efficient and economical intercity transportation systems.
In support of this legislation, the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
argued that the demonstrations are "essential before commitments are made to major
public investment for transportation in the northeast corridor or other corridors." H.R.
REP. No. 845, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
51 "[T]his agency is charged with the duty of promoting air transportation. Normally,
the Board should not, consistent with this mandate, take action which would diminish or
interfere with the accessibility and use of air transportation by the public." Eastern North
Carolina Airline Serv. Airport Investigation, CAB Order No. E-21051 (July 10, 1964).
52 See generally Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
"We have to face the fact.., that short of creating a wholly new agency with authority
to act on environmental issues, we have no alternative but to work with those existing
organizations which have, so far, failed, and, worse, shown little or no interest in
succeeding. . . . []f these existing agencies won't see the challenge, new legislation to
make them do so would be difficult to get enacted and even more difficult to get them
to implement effectively." Representative Richard L. Ottinger, in 113 CONG. REc. A5057
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1967).
1968]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Board has identified and considered only one cost of air transportation
-government subsidies-with any degree of regularity. Subsidies are
rarely an issue in service to major metropolitan areas; only local service
has been subsidized in recent years.53 The Board has occasionally
pointed to problems of airport congestion,"4 and is beginning to do so
more often;55 it has found safety relevant in some proceedings.56
But the Board has utterly disregarded environmental impact, a
major external cost of air transportation.57 There is presently no
method of placing a dollar cost on environmental impact, particu-
larly the impact of additional air transportation on an area already
plagued by overflights. No systems analysis, no cost-benefit approach
has been able to account for this kind of cost.58 This should not be
taken, however, as an excuse to neglect it.59
Not all aircraft produce an equal amount of noise; moreover, the
offensiveness of aircraft noise varies with such factors as the frequency
of flights.a0 Assuming equally noisy aircraft, the impact of the first
daily overflight introduced into a residential area may be less than
53 1966 CAB ANNUAL REPORT 35.
54 New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94, 111 (1956); Middle Atlantic Area Case, 9 C.A.B.
131, 180 (1948); Air Commuting, Inc., New York City Area, 8 C.A.B. 1 (1947).
55 See Service to White Plains, N.Y., CAB Order No. E-25913 (Nov. 2, 1967) (order
instituting Docket No. 19201), and Washington-Baltimore Airport Investigation, CAB
Order No. E-25319 (June 20, 1967) (order instituting Docket No. 18712), as well as
Northeast Corridor VTOL Investigation, CAB Order No. E-19078 (Oct. 4, 1967), for
recent expressions of Board concern.
50 E.g., Spearfish Suspension Case, 18 C.A.B. 657 (1954); All American Aviation, Pick-
Up, Delivery Service, 2 CA.B. 133, 151-52 (1940).
57 It has also refused to consider the impact of authorizing additional air service on
railroads, holding that it will not "retard air transportation for the railroads' protection
and benefit." New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94, 119-20 (1956).
58 To the extent that noise in residential areas results in decreased property values, a
numerical estimate of the cost is theoretically possible. But it is hardly practicable to
isolate this factor from others affecting property values. Economists are just beginning to
attempt to assess the magnitude of property value loss associated with environmental
pollution. See the estimates of loss from air pollution in Ridker & Henning, The Deter-
minants of Residential Property Values with Special Reference to Air Pollution, 49 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 246 (1967). Moreover, this loss of value is not the only cost of environmental
pollution.
59 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals said in affirming CAB issuance
of a certificate: "The conclusion to be reached is not a figure, and the factors from which
the conclusion must be fashioned under the statute are not dollar amounts. In large
part they are imponderables .... There is no formula for combining these elements into
a conclusion." United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 155 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1946). What
is involved is a choice between courses of action; it can validly be made without precise
predictions of the results of each course. Id.
60 Other factors related to the offensiveness of aircraft noise have been identified,
including time of day of flights, ambient noise levels in the area, atmospheric conditions,
and nonquantifiable factors such as the economic importance of air transportation to the
community, the degree of change associated with the introduction of new operations,
and the reaction of responsible authorities. BOLT, BERANEK 9 NEWMAN, INC., LAND USE
PLANNING RELATING TO Amnac-r NoisE (1964).
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that of the two hundredth. And the marginal impact of the two hun-
dredth is not great. It could be argued, therefore, that it makes no
sense to require Board consideration of the environmental impact of
either the first air service introduced over an area (assuming a minimal
number of flights are contemplated) or additional service once a certain,
as yet indeterminate, level of service has been reached.61 By this view,
carried to its logical conclusion, environmental impact can never be a
decisive factor in certification proceedings.
An obvious exception to this argument is the authorization of a
new type of air transportation that would introduce a significant num-
ber of offensive overflights in an area previously untroubled by air-
craft noise. Moreover, the argument that the marginal environmental
impact of additional service is the relevant factor is not necessarily
valid. It is akin to saying that aesthetic considerations in the Storm
King case02 deserve only scant attention because most of the natural
beauty of the Hudson has already been destroyed.63 The reasoning
that would lead a regulatory agency to say that, having allowed the
creation of a situation damaging residential areas, it need not give
much attention to any worsening of the situation resulting from its
future decisions, leaves something to be desired.
Environmental impact should be measured with reference to alter-
native transportation schemes. Its assessment depends on an estimation
of the incidence of environmental impact from particular service. For
noise, proposed routing, altitudes, schedules, equipment, and landing
sites are all significant. With information on these variables and data
on noise emission of aircraft, it would be possible to estimate the num-
ber of persons, enterprises, and parks, historic, and scenic areas that
would be inconvenienced by the proposed service. The extent of this
inconvenience, in the absence of established noise standards, is more
difficult to judge. Such standards as do exist, imperfect as they are,
could be used to determine whether the number for whom the in-
61 An example of this kind of reasoning is found in the hearing examiner's denial of
citizens' groups intervention in the Washington/Baltimore Helicopter Serv. Investigation.
The examiner found that the impact of new helicopter service on existing noise condi-
tions primarily stemming from the operations of Washington National Airport "will
constitute a negligible addition to the principal sources of noise." CAB Order No. E-25435
(July 19, 1967) (issued under delegated authority; aff'd by the Board in Order No.
E-25704, discussed in note 9 supra and accompanying text).
62 From which arose Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
63 Economically, this conclusion might be perfecty justified. See Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960). But the decision of a regulatory agency, while
guided by economics, is also a political decision. The whole thrust of Scenic Hudson and
Udall is that the nation is willing to sacrifice current production to preserve natural
amenities and 'that regulatory agencies cannot disregard this national commitment to
economic suboptimization.
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convenience is serious is great enough to outweigh the public need for
additional air service, particularly where feasible transportation alter-
natives exist.
In the introduction of totally new service, such as VTOL in the
northeast corridor, there is an additional consideration. Not only will
the establishment of the service have an impact on people on the
ground, its inauguration will require the construction of new airports.
Clearly, the costs (as well as the benefits) associated with their con-
struction are relevant to a determination whether the service is re-
quired for the public convenience and necessity. Not all of these costs
are direct. Of equal, perhaps even greater, importance is the effect the
establishment of the airport will have on surrounding land use. Loca-
tion of VTOL airports in urban renewal areas, as the Board is con-
sidering, would impose strictures on development of the remainder of
the renewal area to assure compatibility. 4 The significance of this
constraint on inner city development will vary, of course, from city
to city.
There may well be instances in which environmental impact, in
conjunction with other factors, will tip the balance against the au-
thorization of any new air service over a particular route. In other
cases, however, any findings as to public inconvenience caused by noise
and other deleterious byproducts of air transportation will indicate,
not that the application should be totally rejected, but that the service
authorized should be limited in some manner to minimize its intru-
siveness while not destroying its usefulness to the traveling public. In
these circumstances, the Board should carefully define the authorized
service in the certificate.
A certificate issued under section 401 specifies the terminal and
intermediate points between which the carrier is authorized to engage
in air transportation and the service to be rendered. The Board has
the authority to attach "such reasonable terms, conditions, and limita-
tions as the public interest may require" to the exercise of the privi-
leges granted by the certificate.6 5 The Board has indicated that the
question of what operating restrictions or limitations should be im-
posed is implicit in every route proceeding.66 Under the Act, however,
no term, condition, or limitation may:
64 See President's Memorandum to Ileads of Departments and Agencies, Aircraft Noise
and Land Use Near Airports. 3 WEEKLY COMPIL. PREs. Docs. 527 (March 27, 1967). The
President directed all executive departments and agencies "to take into explicit and due
account aircraft noise whenever it is relevant to any of their programs or to action in
which they participate" and to cooperate with HUD, the department "most concerned
with compatible land use in the vicinity of airports," as well as DOT on this problem.
65 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1964).
e6 See Southeastern Area Local-Serv. Case, 30 C.A.B. 1318, 1445 (1960) (supplemental
opinion and order on reconsideration).
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restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or change sched-
ules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities for perform-
ing the authorized transportation and service as the develop-
ment of the business and the demands of the public shall
require.67
Despite this prohibition, the Board has considerable power to define
and limit the authorized service in light of the requirements of the
public convenience and necessity.68
It is settled that the Board may designate an airport as a service
point if the public interest requires.6 9 The air transportation regulated
under the Federal Aviation Act is that between places, not necessarily
between cities.70 By this reasoning, it would seem that the Board could
delimit the area within which an airport for new service (such as
VTOL) would have to be located. The Board has asserted its authority
to define the scope of proceedings in such a manner as to limit the
possible location of an airport.71 In the Northeast Corridor VTOL
Investigation, the Board will consider "landing sites in the respective
metropolitan areas, excluding the existing air carrier airports serving
the named cities."72 On an evidentiary record, the Board might define
the landing site in much more specific terms. For example, to minimize
the environmental impact of the service for which a certificate is
granted, the Board might authorize service to a point within a given
radius of the center of the city, but not less than a given distance
from any residential, historic, or recreational area. Alternatively, it
might specify the type of land use zone within which the service point
must be located.73
67 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(4) (1964).
68 Since the "public interest" as defined in the Act, § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964), is
coextensive with the "public convenience and necessity," the Board may impose limita-
tions by reference to the same criteria.
69 City of Dallas v. CAB, 221 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 914 (1955);
accord, Airport Comm'n of Forsyth County v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962).
70 City of Dallas v. CAB, 221 F.2d 501, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, § 101(21), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21) (1964).
71 It has also considered the location of existing airports as a relevant factor in public
convenience and necessity determinations. E.g., New Castle County Airport Comm'n v.
CAB, 371 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Outagamie County v. CAB, 355 F.2d 900 (7th Cir.
1966); City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1965).
72 CAB Order No. E-25779 (Oct. 4, 1967) (footnote omitted). The Board does leave
open the precise definition of "metropolitan area," but it clearly intends some areal
limitation of landing sites. See also Washington, D.C. Helicopter Serv. Case, 38 CA.B. 828,
834 (1963) (proposed location for heliport a factor in denial of certificate).
73 Obviously, as a practical matter, the Board would not want to designate a service
point with such specificity as to make the inauguration of the service-for which the
Board has found a public need outweighing its drawbacks-contingent on construction
of an airport at a precise location. It is for this reason that the suggestion made here
is for designation of land use zones or limitations on distances from downtown and
residential areas.
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The Board has also recognized its authority to limit the type of
equipment a carrier may use, despite the prohibition in section 401
(e)(4). In granting a certificate for service by rotary wing aircraft in
Los Angeles Airways Renewal Case, the Board held that:
[T]he authority to specify the service to be rendered neces-
sarily includes the power to define in precise terms the kind
of service to be rendered in such a way that the authorization
will conform to and spell out the service which is found to be
required by the public convenience and necessity, and in
such a way that the authorization will not permit greater
service than that found to be required by the needs of the
public.74
The Board has designated equipment type in helicopter service cases
to prevent competition with local service air carriers.7 5 Under the
holding in Los Angeles Airways, however, it may specify equipment
type for any reason consonant with the public convenience and neces-
sity. Its authority to specify the service authorized extends to other
factors, as well. It could define "in precise terms" not only the type of
equipment to be used, but also airways to be utilized and other
operating criteria designed to keep environmental impact below a
reasonable standard consistent with the public convenience and
necessity.
Simply by calling a restriction a specification of the kind of service
required by the public convenience and necessity, the Board cannot
circumvent the prohibition of section 401(e)(4). The "mere form of
the Board's order would not be controlling, if its substance were in
conflict with the terms of the Act."76 For this reason, the Board's au-
thority to define service to be offered may not extend to a specification
of the number of flights per day between service points.77 But, just as
the Board has undoubted authority to specify seasonal operations, 78
it presumably could limit service to those hours of the day when
environmental impact is minimized.
In these areas, municipal airport authorities and the FAA have regu-
latory power, as the Board has indicated.7 9 It may be reasonable, in
74 Los Angeles Airways Renewal Case, 27 CA.B. 56, 40 (1958). The Board found
support for its specification of equipment type in Crescent Express Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 320 U.S. 401 (1943).
75 See New York Airways Renewal Case, 80 C.A.B. 898, 902-03 (1960).
76 City of Dallas v. CAB, 221 F.2d 501, 503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
77 United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 278 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 364 U.S. 297 (1960).
78 Service in the Rocky Mtn. States Area, 6 C.A.B. 695, 739 (1946).
79 Washington/Baltimore Helicopter Serv. Investigation, CAB Order No. E-25704
(Sept. 19, 1967).
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particular proceedings, for the Board to leave the regulation of en-
vironmental impact to these agencies.80 To the extent that environ-
mental impact is relevant to public convenience and necessity, how-
ever, the Board itself might consider specification of service in terms
that will minimize this impact. While such specification would restrict
the FAA in its regulation of airspace use and the local airport author-
ity in its choice of site or runway patterns, the restriction is different
only in degree and not in kind from that stemming from any certificate
of public convenience and necessity. Legally, there would appear to
be no difficulty, since neither the FAA nor the airport authority need
take the further action necessary to allow the carrier to implement the
authorized service.81 Participation by the Department of Transporta-
tion and municipal authorities in a proceeding will, of course, aid the
Board in framing its certificate in realistic terms.8 2
II
Most air carrier operations with significant environmental impact,
with the exception of V/STOL service, have already been authorized
by the Board.83 New subsonic jets and the supersonic transport will
probably be introduced on existing routes, as new equipment has been
in the past. Although the Board could utilize its statutory authority to
amend or modify outstanding certificates to redefine authorized service
in order to minimize the environmental impact of new equipment (or
other changes in conditions),84 there is little likelihood of its doing so."5
Effective regulation requires a more direct approach.
80 Cf. North Central Airlines, Inc. Renewal of Temporary Intermediate Points, 32
CA.B. 1205, 1222 (1961) (safety of an airport approved as safe by the proper governmental
authorities not at issue).
81 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(i), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(i) (1964) provides that: "No
certificate shall confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive right in the use of any
airspace, Federal airway, landing area or air-navigation facility." Implementation of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity requires an air carrier operating certificate
from the FAA and arrangement for a landing area through lease from an airport operator
or other means.
82 The view of the FAA is entitled to great weight. See Spearfish Suspension Case,
18 C.A.B. 657, 664 (1954).
83 Some under "grandfather" certificates, issued to carriers operating in 1958 when the
Civil Aeronautics Act became law, without any requirement of a showing of public
convenience and necessity. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 401(e), 52 Stat. 988.
84 Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1964), the
Board may "alter, amend, modify, or suspend any ... certificate, in whole or in part, if
the public convenience and necessity so require." But see CAB v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 367
U.S. 316 (1961); Ryan, The Revocation of an Airline Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity, 15 J. An L. & Com. 377 (1948).
85 Indeed, a large proportion of the Board's regulatory activity under section 401 in
recent years has been directed at realigning routes to conform to the operating require-
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That direct regulation might come from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, and to some extent it has. Under section 307(c) of the
Federal Aviation Act, the Administrator of the FAA prescribes air
traffic rules governing aircraft flight in navigable airspace
for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft,
for the protection of persons and property on the ground, and
for the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace.8 6
The inclusion of "the protection of persons and property on the
ground" among the purposes of air traffic rules is construed by the
FAA as authorizing noise abatement rules8 7 Existing noise abatement
procedures were promulgated under this provision. While there has
been debate about the efficacy of these rules,s8 the FAA cannot be
faulted for neglecting noise in designing flight procedures. It has
repeatedly stated that it considers noise second only to safety as a
matter of regulatory concern.
But these noise abatement rules are applied to aircraft, engines, and
equipment for which type, production, and airworthiness certificates
are issued without regard to their noise characteristics,8 9 flown by air
carriers under operating certificates issued with reference to safety
criteria alone.90
The Administrator claims that he has no statutory authority to
develop and apply noise standards in these certification proceedings.
This contention is open to question. Arguably, the Administrator
could regulate aircraft noise directly, under the present statute, by
refusing to certify aircraft that do not meet noise standards and by
ments and economies of new equipment, particularly short-range jets, at the request of
carriers. See generally 1966 CAB ANNUAL REPORT 1-6.
86 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1964).
87 See House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 374. The in.
clusion of this language may not have been an attempt by Congress to provide for noise
abatement rules. The history of air traffic rules-beginning with the Air Commerce Act
of 1926-indicates that the primary concern with regard to those on the ground was the
danger of crashes in heavily populated areas and of objects falling from aircraft in flight.
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF LEGIsLATIvE COUNSEL, CIVIL AERONAUTICS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
Am COMMERCE ACr OF 1926 (1928); D. WmHrNAH, SAFER SKYWAYS: FEDRAL CONTROL OF
AVIATION, 1926-1966 (1966). The present language was first used in the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, but even at that late date there was no indication of any additional congres-
sional concern with noise.
88 There have been claims that they jeopardize safety nnd that they are less effective
than alternative flight procedures in abating noise. See H.R. REP. No. 26, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1963).
89 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 603, 49 U.S.C. § 1428 (1964). Certification requires
compliance with minimum standards prescribed by the Administrator "to promote safety
of flight." Id. § 601(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1964).
90 Id. § 604, 49 U.S.C. § 1424 (1964). Air carrier operating certificates include conditions
"reasonably necessary to assure safety in air transportation.' Zd.
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placing conditions on air carrier operating authority."' And the De-
partment of Transportation has admitted that the Administrator could
regulate noise characteristics of aircraft indirectly, by establishing
flight rules under section 307(c) stringent enough to prohibit the use
of the noisiest aircraft without modifications to quiet them.92
Neither course has been adopted. Instead, the FAA has sought
amendment to the Federal Aviation Act to give it authority to set
noise and sonic boom standards and apply them in title VI certification
proceedings. 9 3 Attempts to add this type of provision to the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act failed on the House floor in 1966. 94 A
91 In performing his duties, the Administrator is bound by a definition of the "public
interest" similar in form to that prescribed for the Board. The preamble to section 103,
in its codified form, reads:
In the exercise and performance of his powers and duties under this chapter
the Administrator shall consider the following, among other things, as being in
the public interest
and is followed by five criteria relating primarily to safety, promotion and development
of air commerce, and control of the use of navigable airspace for the safety and efficiency
of both civil and military aircraft. Id. § 103, 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964). A "public interest"
standard is specifically prescribed in a number of sections of the Act. Id. §§ 307(a), (e),
505, 601(c), 607, 610(b), 1104, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348(a), (e), 1405, 1421(c), 1427, 1430(b), 1504
(1964). Cf. id. §§ 305, 306, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1347 (1964), which prescribe policy for the
Administrator and would be duplicative of section 103, at least in part, if that section
were construed as a declaration of policy binding the Administrator.
The Department of Transportation Act, however, broadens the applicability of section
103. In transferring the powers and duties of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Agency and requiring their delegation to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration within the Department, the Act provides that, in exercising his functions,
powers, and duties pertaining to aviation safety, the Administrator "shall be guided by
the declaration of policy in section 103 of the Federal Aviation Act." Department of
Transportation Act § 6(c)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1655(c)(1) (Supp. 1966). Arguably, therefore, the
limitation of the sections dealing with equipment and air carrier operating certificates to
safety considerations may no longer be effective. The FAA's regulatory authority is now
coextensive with the policy of section 103. With reference to the similarly worded
preamble of section 102, the Department of Transportation has argued that it requires
"only that the Board consider the six enumerated categories 'among other things,' and
does not limit the Board's duty to consider other public interest factors." DOT Helicopter
Answer, supra note 10, at 2. "The public interest in safely attainable quiet is obvious."
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
(dictum). Just as with the Board, two of the criteria--subsections (a) and (c)-might be
interpreted to include noise among the relevant public interest factors.
Militating against this construction is the FAA's position that new legislative authority
is needed. Moreover, the House debate on adding noise abatement regulatory authority
to the Department of Transportation Act proceeded on the unspoken premise that the
Federal Aviation Act provided no authority of this sort. 112 CONG. REo. H19517-21,
H19523 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1966); id. at H20346-55 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1966). See also H.R.
REp. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1963).
92 House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 507. The Depart-
ment argues, however: "This course of action would be less direct and less likely to
achieve the design objectives we have in mind." Id.
93 See supra note 12.
94 See supra note 91.
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House committee held hearings, but no bill was reported out during
the 89th Congress.9 5 Prospects for passage in the 90th Congress are
better although the legislation has been moving at a dilatory pace.90
Its enactment, or the assertion of regulatory authority by the FAA
without new legislation, may not be an unmixed blessing. The Federal
Aircraft Noise Committee, which includes the FAA, has argued that
adoption of the legislation may "affect the liability of the Federal
Government for... property losses" caused by aircraft noise because
it might be construed to preclude inverse condemnation recoveries
against airport operators:
Assume the enactment and implementation of the legisla-
tion, so that a given aircraft is certificated to operate at 100
PNdB [perceived noise decibels]. If such aircraft are so oper-
ated, in any litigation alleging a taking by reason of 100
PNdB over-flights, a court could conclude that the cause of
the taking was Federal certification rather than inadequate
acquisition by the airport.
This does not mean, the committee continues, that the federal govern-
ment should assume liability; whether or not it should is a "problem
[to] be answered on the basis of an objective cost/benefit analysis."
But, to the extent that the federal government exercises its right to
regulate aircraft noise, "the answer may be supplied by a court finding
that the airport operator is without fault" because of the federal certi-
fication.97
Federal liability might follow from such a holding. A more likely
result, however, is that the difficulty of proof of a taking in the consti-
tutional sense98 would be compounded. If, as in the committee's hypo-
thetical, the aircraft were operating within the noise maxima pre-
scribed by the FAA (under legislation which empowers the Secretary
of Transportation "to prescribe and amend such rules and regulations
as he may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of
aircraft noise and sonic boom"), the plaintiffs might have a difficult
time showing that they had been damaged or that the damage was not
damnum absque injuria. Even assuming federal liability under the
fifth amendment, that liability may be more limited than that of pub-
lic airport authorities, especially those in states whose constitutions
95 The legislation was introduced in July 1966; hearings were held on October 12.
96 S. 707 and H.R. 3400 were introduced early in the first session; House hearings were
held in mid-November 1967.
97 House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 375.
98 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946).
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provide for compensation for damaging as well as taking.9 9 One effect
of FAA regulation, therefore, might be the restriction of private rem-
edies. 100
Another might be the preclusion of local regulation of aircraft noise.
Two ordinances seeking to regulate aircraft noise have been chal-
lenged in federal courts. One simply banned all overflights below
1000 feet; 101 the other, in form a general noise abatement ordinance,
was found to have the effect of banning overflights. 10 2 Both were held
unconstitutional, as applied to aircraft, under the commerce clause.'0 3
It is doubtful that other ordinances could meet the constitutional test
prescribed in these cases, but, absent express federal regulation of air-
craft noise, some might.1°4 If Congress explicitly provides for noise
99 See Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1373, 1381-1410 (1965); Stoebuck,
Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DIxK. L.
REv. 207 (1967); Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. AxR L. & Comr. 387,
398-407 (1966). Tondel points out that federal fifth amendment "taking" is not always
more narrowly construed than "taking" under state constitutions. But twenty-six states
have constitutional provisions requiring compensation for a damaging or injury, as well
as a taking. Id. at 404 n.93. Compare Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376
P.2d 100 (1962), 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966), Martin v. Port of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d
309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), and Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960), with Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). Accord, Neher v. United States, 265
F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967); Bennett v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.. Okla. 1965);
Bellamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Avery v. United States, 330
F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
100 Contrast the recent suggestion that provision should be made for treble damages
for injury from aircraft noise. Parkhurst, Noise, jets, and the Sonic Boom, reprinted in
113 CONG. REC. H14550, H14552 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1967).
1o1 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955),
aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
102 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
103 Section 104 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964), and a comparable
section of the prior Civil Aeronautics Act, declare a public right of freedom of transit
through navigable airspace, including (under the current provision) the space needed to
insure safety in take-off and landing. See id. § 101(24), 49 U.S.C. § 1801(24) (1964).
104 For example, legislation requiring that aircraft flying over a municipality use
dispersed flight paths rather than a single noise corridor might be both feasible and
desirable in some circumstances. Certainly, if a community adopted an ordinance at
variance with, but less restrictive than, FAA-established flight procedures, the burden on
those challenging the ordinance to show that it interferes with freedom of transit in
navigable airspace would be more difficult to meet than in the Hempstead or Cedarhurst
cases. One instance of the noise corridor situation, though not one amenable to local
regulation, is the use of the Potomac River by jet flights in and out of Washington
National Airport. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, POTOMAC PLANNING TASK FORCE, THE
POTOMAC: A REPORT ON ITS IMPERILED FUTURE AND A GUIDE FOR ITS ORDERLY DEVELOPIENT
76 (1967). Another type of regulation, imposed by airport authorities as lessors of airport
facilities, establishing preferential runway patterns and limiting hours of operation may
be constitutional under present federal regulation, but not if Congress expressly provides
for noise regulation under title VI. Cf. Port of N.Y. Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
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regulation under title VI, the presumption of unconstitutionality of
local regulation would be difficult to surmount.
A single regulatory scheme, under federal auspices, is clearly desir-
able. The national interest in having an air transportation system
transcends any local interest of the communities near airports or under
flight paths or sonic boom corridors. But the local interest-or at least
the aggregate of local interests throughout the nation-should be
reflected in the regulation of air transportation. The performance of
the FAA has led some observers to doubt the wisdom of giving regula-
tory authority over aircraft noise to an agency strongly committed to
the development and promotion of aviation. One commentator has
said that the FAA's "'regulations' mark it as an arm of the jet indus-
try."'105 Bo Lundberg, a persistent critic of the SST, cites the
fundamental humanitarian principle that the limits for ac-
ceptable detrimental side effects to technological develop-
ments must not be decided upon by the party who has an
economic or other interest in the development .... "Whether
or not a noise is acceptable, must under no circumstances be
determined by the party who produces the noise."' 0
The FAA attempts to keep separate its SST development activities
and the certification of the aircraft. General William F. McKee, FAA
Administrator, has said that the agency will not certify the SST (or
the French-British Concorde) unless it meets safety standards. 07 None-
theless, it may not be totally amiss to question the objectivity with
which sonic boom certification standards would be developed under
the pending legislation in view of the FAA's commitment to the
SST.108
While the conflict is not as obvious, the pressures on the FAA to
259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). On the constitutionality of the exercise of the local
police power in the face of congressional regulation, see Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); H.R. RE. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1963);
Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 H~Auv. L. Rav. 1581
(1961).
105 Parkhurst, supra note 100, at H14561.
106 Senate 1968 DOT Appropriations Hearings, supra note 8, at 567. The statement
quoted by Lundberg is by Dr. Professor G. Lehmann, Director of the Max Planck-Institut
fur Arbeitsphysiologie, Dortmund, Germany.
107 Id. at 413.
108 In the design competition for the SST, the FAA established its objectives for
sonic boom intensity as 2.5 p.s.f. (pounds per square foot) during acceleration, 1.5 p.s.f.
during cruise for the overseas version, and 2 p.s.f. during acceleration, 1.5 p.s.f. during
cruise for the domestic, overland version. The predicted overpressures for the accepted
design presently in the prototype stage, on a coast-to-coast flight, are 1.98 ps.f. during
acceleration, 1.72 p.s.f. at the beginning and 1.55 at the end of cruise. House 1968 DOT
Appropriations Hearings, supra note 8, at 816-17, 818.
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adopt relatively lax noise standards for subsonic jets and other aircraft
will also be great. It has already circulated tentative noise criteria to
members of the aircraft industry and, in anticipation of the legislation,
is working with them to develop its certification program. 109 The pres-
ent thinking within the FAA is that acceptable standards would pro-
vide for a noise level of 106 PNdB three miles from the airport.110
Whether this is an appropriate standard is open to debate; NASA sets
100 PNdB as the level at which "a noise problem exists with people.""'
The problem of aircraft noise, insofar as it is amenable to regula-
tion, is not necessarily solved, therefore, by authorizing the FAA to
establish standards."2 The need is for regulation by a more impartial
agency, better able to balance the needs of air transportation with
those of people on the ground." 3
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the effect of the enactment
of the pending legislation would be official sanction of the status quo,
at least until significant technological developments (such as quieter
jet engines) are considered economically feasible by the FAA. The
federal regulatory effort seems aimed at assuring that the situation gets
no worse, although as air transportation continues to expand there are
bound to be more airport neighbors complaining about more over-
flights.114 This will be particularly true as federal research and devel-
opment efforts lead to introduction of V/STOL and SST craft.
109 House 1968 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 367. The majority
of industry members who responded to the proposal supported, in principle, the need for
noise certification standards.
110 Id. at 454 (testimony of David D. Thomas, Deputy Administrator of the FAA).
The Boeing 747, the large capacity aircraft now being built, would meet these standards.
Id. at 446. The 747's predicted noise characteristics are "comparable, as an average whole,
to the noise generated by medium range jet aircraft" now in use. Id. at 376. Stretched
versions of current jets, on the other hand, may aggravate the noise problem. Id. at 378.
111 Id. at 42 (prepared statement of Alfred J. Eggers, Jr., Deputy Associate Administra-
tor for Advanced Research and Technology). 100 PNdB is about the level of speech inter-
ference. Id. at 335 (testimony of Charles W. Harper, Director, Aeronautics Division,
Office of Advanced Research and Technology, NASA).
112 As introduced, S. 707 and H.R. 3400 would delegate the regulatory authority to the
Secretary of Transportation, not the Administrator of the FAA. But there seems to be
little doubt, at least within the FAA, that the authority would be further delegated
to them.
113 On an analogous point with regard to the safety regulation of nuclear reactors,
see Green, Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEo. WAm. L. Rxv.
121 (1964).
114 The NASA presentation to the House Aeronautics and Space Committee includes
a chart on the noise problem at a typical metropolitan airport. It shows that one mile to
the side of the midpoint of the runway the composite noise rating (PNdB level adjusted
for the number of operations) has exceeded 100 since about 1960 and that the number
of operations has doubled in the last ten years. House 1968 NASA Authorization Hear-
ings, supra note 2, pt. 4, at 43.
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One possible check on the FAA is to provide for a local voice in
determining noise abatement procedures around airports. There are
several forms such a provision might take. The simplest would require
the FAA to take local preferences into account in establishing flight
paths and procedures and designating airways.1 5 A greater local role
could be assured by granting localities permissive authority to adopt
noise standards, subject to veto on a finding that the enforcement of
the standards would adversely affect aviation safety or that compliance
would be economically impracticable. The Administrator would be
given the power to suspend a local regulation pending the outcome of
a hearing on its impact on safety and the feasibility of compliance.""
The latter type of provision would have to be carefully drafted to
avoid difficulties under the Ashbacker doctrine, n 7 since noise standards
adopted by one locality might force flights over other localities which
had not yet acted. Difficulties of coordination among numerous local-
ities would frequently be worked out by compromise among them,
obviating the necessity for the Administrator to seek federal nullifica-
tion of standards adopted by only one of the communities and the
intervention of the others in the hearing. The legislation might even
require regional action by all of the affected communities whenever
there is more than one that wishes to regulate. 18
CONCLUSION
There has been little indication that the federal agencies which reg-
ulate air transportation are willing to commit themselves to a policy
of minimizing its environmental impact. Despite some of the rhetoric
of the Department of Transportation, the FAA has done little in this
area. Indeed, it has declared its powerlessness to regulate aircraft noise
effectively while seeking legislation which it apparently intends to
115 A provision requiring that fair consideration be given to the interests of communi-
ties in or near which air operations are authorized or airways established, for example.
116 Such hearings might properly be held before the National Transportation Safety
Board.
117 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 526 U.S. 527 (1945). Cf. American Airlines, Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 231-32, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
118 This might necessitate state (or even multi-state) enabling legislation to create a
regional authority with a very limited role. Such a complicated procedure, and the
designation of a regional body for this purpose, seems unnecessary if local governments
could accomplish the same result by informal coordination. At first glance, the test used
in the Hempstead case for the constitutionality of a local ordinance-consideration of
the questioned ordinance "as if it were one of a set of ordinances each enacted by a
bordering town, and all, taken together, encompassing the airport" (272 F. Supp. at 231)
-seems to create an incentive for this cooperation. But, as applied in that case, the result
would be that only the status quo could be adopted. The problem of dealing with
multiple jurisdictions is not so easily solved.
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utilize to preserve the status quo. The CAB has yet to accept any
responsibility for the environmental consequences of the activity it
regulates.
The problem of aircraft noise, like other environmental effects of
government-sponsored or government-regulated economic activity, is
not amenable to one best solution dependent on analyses of its dollar
costs. It turns primarily on policy choices which are only imperfectly
quantifiable. Standards for regulating aircraft noise depend more on a
policy judgment as to the importance of maintaining or improving the
character of particular areas relative to the importance of improved
air transportation than on the quantifiable costs of aircraft noise con-
trasted with the quantifiable benefits derived from air transportation.
The decision is essentially a legislative one. If it is to be made in ad-
ministrative proceedings, it is incumbent upon the regulatory agencies
to assure that environmental issues are considered. This might best
be done through participation by a governmental agency with the spe-
cific function of representing and promoting the public interest in the
quality of the environment and the resources and expertise to do the
job properly. Prospects for the establishment of such an agency, how-
ever, are not bright. In the meantime, in the particular area of air
transportation, the GAB and the Department of Transportation have a
responsibility for assuring that their regulatory activities serve the
interests of the public as a whole. Their commitment to minimizing
the intrusiveness of air transportation is badly needed.
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